

Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PARM, UK, GW

SUBJECT:US ARMS CONTROL BILATERALS WITH UK AND FRG: SALT

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1. FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS USED BY ACDA ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR SLOSS TO BRIEF UK AND FRG ON SALT DURING ARMS CONTROL BILATERALS MARCH 15 AND 17. BRACKETED PARAGRAPHS WERE USED IN BRIEFING BRITISH BUT NOT GERMANS. DISCUSSIONS WHICH FOLLOWED SLOSS BRIEFINGS ARE BEING REPORTED SEPTELS.

2. TEXT OF SLOSS TALKING POINTS:

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

--OUR BASIC PURPOSE REMAINS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREE-
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MENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITHIN THEFRAMEWORK
ESTABLISHED BY THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AND TO DO SO BEFORE
THE INTERIM AGREEMENT EXPIRES IN OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR.

--WE ALSO HOPE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF SIGNIFICANT
REDUCTIONS BELOW THE VLADIVOSTOK LEVELS TO BE INCORPORATED
IMMEDIATELY IN THE PRESENT TREATY, RATHER THAN WAITING FOR

FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD
STILL BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED BY VLADIVOSTOK OF

EQUAL AGGREGATE LEVELS AND EQUAL NUMBERS OF MIRV LAUNCHERS.

--THERE IS NO DISPUTE OVER THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AND MOST OF THESE HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO AGREED LANGUAGE IN GENEVA. HOWEVER, THERE REMAIN DIFFICULT ISSUES OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF TWO OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AND OVER ADDITIONAL ISSUES THAT WERE NOT COVERED AT VLADIVOSTOK. THESE INCLUDE PRINCIPALLY ISSUES ABOUT THE SOVIET BACKFIRE BOMBER, CRUISE MISSILES OF VARIOUS KINDS, MOBILE MISSILES, PROVISIONS RELATING TO VERIFICATION AND DATA EXCHANGE, AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER.

WE ARE CURRENTLY TAKING A FRESH LOOK AT ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, IN ADDITION TO QUESTIONS OF AGGREGATE LEVELS AND MIRV LEVELS. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET DETERMINED WHAT POSITION SECRETARY VANCE IS TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW AT THE END OF THIS MONTH. WE WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU THE DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS THAT GO INTO OUR THINKING ON THESE ISSUES.

REDUCTIONS

- WE BELIEVE THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN OPPORTUNITY AT THIS STAGE TO GET IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS IN THE AGGREGATE LEVELS AGREED TO AT VLADIVOSTOK. THE MILITARY SECRET

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EFFECT OF SUCH REDUCTIONS PROBABLY WOULD BE NEGLIGIBLE. HOWEVER, GETTING REDUCTIONS AT THIS STAGE COULD BE A VALUABLE PRECEDENT AND PROVIDE USEFUL MOMENTUM FOR THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.

- WE HAVE STUDIED THE EFFECT OF EQUAL AGGREGATES AT ROUGHLY THE VLADIVOSTOK LEVEL AS WELL AS AT LOWER LEVELS. WE ARE EXAMINING A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT POSSIBLE LEVELS. THE LOWEST LEVEL WE HAVE CONSIDERED, EVEN AS A HYPOTHETICAL CASE, WOULD BE A REDUCTION OF ROUGHLY 1/3 FROM THE VLADIVOSTOK LEVELS. WITH LOWER AGGREGATE LEVELS, WE HAVE EXAMINED LOWER MIRV LEVELS AS WELL. NONE OF THE REDUCTIONS IMPINGE SIGNIFICANTLY ON RELATIVE U.S./SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES OR ON OUR ABILITY TO MEET TARGETTING REQUIREMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, REDUCTIONS WILL NOT AFFECT COMMITMENTS OF U.S. FORCES TO SACEUR'S STRIKE PLAN.

- SOVIET INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS IS UNCERTAIN. REDUCTIONS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE. IN FACT, AT THE LEVELS WE ARE CONSIDERING, PROBABLY THE CHIEF DISADVANTAGE OF REDUCTIONS IS THAT THEY MAY BE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE BECAUSE OF SOVIET RESISTANCE. ONE ISSUE IS WHETHER REDUCTIONS ARE WORTH U.S. CONCESSIONS ON OTHER ISSUES.

- IN THE NEAR TERM, REDUCTIONS IN THE AGGREGATE LEVELS WILL AFFECT THE SOVIETS MORE THAN OURSELVES, BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED THE 2400 AGGREGATE LEVEL, WHEREAS THE SOVIETS ARE ALREADY BEYOND IT. HOWEVER, REDUCTIONS IN THE 1320 MIRV LEVEL WILL AFFECT U.S. PROGRAMS SOONER THAN SOVIET PROGRAMS.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH REDUCTIONS, WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET HEAVY ICBMS.
SUCH REDUCTIONS WILL NOT DO MUCH FOR ICBM SURVIVABILITY, BUT ON A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE SCALE COULD COVER THE MISSILE
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THROW-WEIGHT PROBLEM WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE GROW WORSE.

BACKFIRE

- WHETHER THE BACKFIRE BOMBER IS TO BE CONSIDERED AS A HEAVY BOMBER UNDER THE TERMS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD, REMAINS ONE OF THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIETS.

- THE SOVIETS ASSERT THAT BACKFIRE IS A MEDIUM BOMBER NOT INTENDED FOR OR CAPABLE OF STRATEGIC USE ("REALISTIC INTER-CONTINENTAL" USE) AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED UNDER THE AGREEMENT.

- FOR US, HOWEVER, BACKFIRE PRESENTS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE CAPABILITIES OF THIS AIRPLANE, IT APPEARS TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE CAPABLE THAN EXISTING SOVIET MEDIUM BOMBERS THAT ARE EXCLUDED FROM SALT. BY SOME ESTIMATES, IT APPROXIMATES THE CAPABILITIES OF THE BISON, THE LEAST CAPABLE OF THE HEAVY BOMBERS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO COUNT IN SALT.

- OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE BACKFIRE ARE THREE-FOLD:

-- THE PRECEDENT THAT COULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE TREATMENT OF FUTURE BOMBERS IF AN AIRPLANE WITH BACKFIRE'S CAPABILITY IS EXCLUDED FROM SALT;

-- THE POSSIBILITY THAT AT LEAST SOME BACKFIRE MIGHT BE GIVEN A STRATEGIC ROLE;

-- THE POSSIBILITY THAT BACKFIRE'S STRATEGIC POTENTIAL MIGHT BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THROUGH SUCH MEASURES AS AERIAL REFUELING, ARCTIC BASING, IMPROVED PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY, OR THE ADDITION OF LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES.

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- THE MEASURES WE HAVE CONSIDERED FOR DEALING WITH BACKFIRE INCLUDE COUNTING IT IN THE AGGREGATE AS A HEAVY BOMBER, THE PREFERRED U.S. ALTERNATIVE; NOT COUNTING IT IN THE AGGREGATE BUT LIMITING THE NUMBER OF BACKFIRE THAT MIGHT BE DEPLOYED; PROHIBITING POSSIBLE INCREASES IN BACKFIRE'S INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO DEFER THIS ISSUE, ALONG WITH THE CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE, TO LATER NEGOTIATIONS.

-- WE ARE ALSO MINDFUL THAT THE SOVIETS MAY RENEW THEIR EFFORTS TO LIMIT FBS IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S. EFFORTS TO LIMIT BACKFIRE.

- THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET MADE A FIRM DECISION ABOUT HOW BACKFIRE OUGHT TO BE TREATED. A FINAL DECISION MAY DEPEND ON HOW OTHER ISSUES ARE RESOLVED.

CRUISE MISSILES

- ANOTHER MAJOR AREA OF DISAGREEMENT CONCERNS CRUISE MISSILES.

- EXPLAIN DISAGREEMENT CONCERNING ASM'S ON BOMBER AIRCRAFT IN AIDE MEMOIRE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED BANNING CRUISE MISSILES OF RANGE GREATER THAN 600 KMS ON OTHER PLATFORMS.

- U.S. POSITION ON CRUISE MISSILES IS COMPLICATED BY CONFLICTING CONSIDERATIONS:

-- ON ONE HAND, WE DO NOT WANT TO OPEN UP A NEW AREA OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION OR PERMIT UNCONSTRAINED DEPLOYMENTS OF CRUISE MISSILES TO UNDERMINE THE NUMERICAL BALANCE ESTABLISHED BY SALT;

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--ON THE OTHER HAND:

(A) CRUISE MISSILES ON HEAVY BOMBERS COULD BE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOMBER FORCE IN FACE OF AIR DEFENSES WHICH ARE NOT CONSTRAINED BY SALT. (MENTION AIR DEFENSE ASYMMETRY);

(B) CRUISE MISSILES COULD HAVE NON-STRATEGIC APPLICATIONS IN ANTI-SHIP OR THEATER-STRIKE ROLES.

ANALYSIS OF CRUISE MISSILE LIMITS IS MADE COMPLICATED BY LARGE UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING:

1. COST AND RELATIVE COST EFFECTIVENESS COMPARED TO OTHER SYSTEMS THAT MIGHT PERFORM THE SAME MISSIONS, E.G. TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, AIRCRAFT, AND ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE SUPPRESSION;

2. POTENTIAL CRUISE MISSILE PERFORMANCE, PARTICULARLY THEIR ABILITY TO PENETRATE AIR DEFENSES;

3. NET ADVANTAGES TO THE SOVIETS, ON THE ONE HAND VS. U.S. AND NATO, ON THE OTHER, OF DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES.

- IN GENERAL, OUR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE CRUISE MISSILE RANGES -- EITHER A SINGLE LIMIT, OR DIFFERENT LIMITS ON DIFFERENT PLATFORMS -- WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE CIRCUMVENTION OF SALT LIMITS, WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS ON NON-STRATEGIC APPLICATIONS OR ON BOMBER PENETRATION CAPABILITIES. WE HAVE NOT YET DECIDED ON A RANGE, OR SET OF RANGES, WHICH WOULD MEET THESE OBJECTIVES. ONE OPTION WHICH WE ARE CONSIDERING IS TO OMIT CRUISE MISSILES ENTIRELY FROM THIS ROUND OF SALT.

- THE DEFINITION OF A CRUISE MISSILE IS STILL AN ISSUE.

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- LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILES ABOVE A RANGE AROUND 2500-3000 KMS WOULD ONLY AFFECT STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE OPTIONS. IT WOULD PRECLUDE AN INTERCONTINENTAL LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILE FORCE AND WOULD CONSTRAIN A FORCE OF DEDICATED SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES. HOWEVER, IT WOULD PERMIT VIRTUALLY ALL NON-STRATEGIC APPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILES BY BOTH SIDES AS WELL AS ALCMS AS A PENETRATION AID.

- AS WE GO FROM 2500 TO 1500 MAIN EFFECTS ARE:

--CONSTRAINS ALCM STANDOFF ROLE BUT NOT AS PENETRATION AID.

--CONSTRAINS DEPLOYMENT AREAS FOR GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AND LIMITS COVERAGE OF TARGETS IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT NOT EASTERN EUROPE. IT WOULD CONSTRAIN SOVIET USE OF GLCMS AGAINST NORTH ATLANTIC SEA LANES.

--CONSTRAINS DEPLOYMENT AREAS FOR SLCMS TO THE POINT OF MARGINAL USEFULNESS FOR LAND-ATTACK ROLE AGAINST EASTERN EUROPE TARGETS.

-- PERMITS SUBSTANTIAL THEATER COVERAGE FROM TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.

IN GENERAL, A 2500 KM LIMIT AFFECTS ONLY STRATEGIC APPLICATIONS. 1500 KMS CONSTRAINS NON-STRATEGIC APPLICA-

TIONS SOMEWHAT. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS LATTER CONSTRAINT DEPENDS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEA-BASED OPTION AND EXTENDED-RANGE LAND-BASED OPTION. IN GENERAL, THIS RANGE PERMITS TARGET COVERAGE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE WITH TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT. PERMITS ALL LIKELY ANTI-SHIP APPLICATIONS.

- 600 KMS SEVERELY CONSTRAINS ALCM ON THE HEAVY BOMBER AND
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GROUND ATTACK OPTIONS FROM SUBMARINES AND SURFACE SHIPS. PERMITS SUBSTANTIAL ANTI-SHIP APPLICATIONS BUT COULD BECOME CONSTRAINING AS LONG-RANGE TARGET ACQUISITION IMPROVES. PERMITS PARTIAL THEATER COVERAGE WITH GLCMS AND TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. 600 KMS ALSO CONSTRAINS SOME SOVIET APPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILES ON MEDIUM BOMBERS OR IN LONG-RANGE ANTI-SHIP ROLES.

- WE HAVE ALSO STUDIED CRUISE MISSILE LIMITS AS LOW AS 300 KMS. SUCH LIMITS WOULD SEVERELY CONSTRAIN CRUISE MISSILE MISSIONS OF BOTH SIDES.

- IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, VERIFYING RANGE LIMITS PRESENTS SEVERE DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE THE RANGE OF THE CRUISE MISSILE DEPENDS ON FACTORS SUCH AS AVAILABLE FUEL, PAYLOAD AND FLIGHT PROFILE, WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO OBSERVE. ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION PROBLEMS WOULD ARISE IF CRUISE MISSILES OF LONGER RANGE ARE PERMITTED ON SOME PLATFORMS AND BANNED ON OTHERS, OR IF EXEMPTIONS ARE MADE FOR UNARMED OR CONVENTIONALLY ARMED CRUISE MISSILES IN ORDER TO AVOID IMPACTS ON NON-STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES.

MOBILE MISSILES

- MOBILE MISSILES PRESENT A DILEMMA WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET RESOLVED:

-- ON THE ONE HAND, IF PERMITTED AND COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE, THEY WOULD MAKE VERIFICATION OF THE AGGREGATE LIMIT MORE DIFFICULT THAN IF MOBILES WERE BANNED.

-- ON THE OTHER HAND, IF BANNED, WE MAY BE FACED WITH A CHOICE BETWEEN MAINTAINING A VULNERABLE LAND-BASED FORCE OR GIVING UP THE ADVANTAGES OF LAND-BASED ICBMS.

- THERE ARE STILL MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE COST AND
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FEASIBILITY OF A U.S. LAND MOBILE SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THIS COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT OPTION. VERIFYING A BAN ON MOBILES

WOULD BE DIFFICULT IF THE SOVIETS DEPLOY SS-20 LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE ALSO CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING SS-16 ICBMS. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT PRESIDENT CARTER INDICATED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS AND IRBMS ALIKE. HOWEVER, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT REACHED A FINAL DECISION ON THIS MATTER.

- WE ARE ALSO AWARE THAT SOVIET MOBILE IRBMS ARE A MATTER OF CONCERN FOR NATO AND INTEND TO WORK CLOSELY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO ENSURE THAT OUR NATO DEFENSE POSTURE, REFLECTED IN THE NATO TRIAD, IS FULLY ADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET THREAT TO EUROPE, OF WHICH THE SS-X-20 IS A PART.

FBS

- WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO AGREE TO THE REOPENING OF THIS ISSUE WHICH WE REGARD AS ALREADY EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION IN SALT TWO. THE SOVIETS HAVE DECLARED THEIR INTENTION TO RAISE FBS IN SALT III, AND HAVE SPECIFICALLY LINKED IT TO THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER ISSUE.

NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER

(- WE ARE AWARE OF YOUR PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT HOW ANY NON-TRANSFER OR NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION AGREED TO IN SALT WOULD AFFECT BRITAIN'S ACCESS, AND THAT OF OUR OTHER NATO ALLIES, TO U.S. WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY.)

- THIS ADMINISTRATION STANDS BY THE PROMISE OF ITS PREDECESSORS TO CONSULT FULLY WITH ITS NATO ALLIES BEFORE PROPOSING ANY TREATY LANGUAGE ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OR NON-TRANSFER TO THE SOVIET UNION.

(- IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WOULD EXPECT BILATERAL CONSULTA-
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TIONS WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT TO PRECEDE MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.)
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